The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water by Dellapenna,
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
2004 Conference Proceedings
7-21-2004
The Importance of Getting Names Right: The
Myth of Markets for Water
Dellapenna
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ucowrconfs_2004
This is the abstract of a presentation given on Wednesday, 21 July 2004, in session 27 of the UCOWR
conference.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conference Proceedings at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 by an
authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dellapenna, "The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water" (2004). 2004. Paper 39.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ucowrconfs_2004/39
 
 
 
 
 
The Importance of Getting Names Right: The 
Myth of Markets for Water 
 
Joseph W. Dellapenna 
Villanova University School of Law 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Markets are now fashionable as institutions for managing water both nationally 
and internationally. True markets, however, have always been rare for water 
rights and there are good reasons for believing that they always will be. Water is 
an ambient resource where the actions of any one user necessarily affect many 
other users. If true markets are relied on to allocate water for particular uses and 
distribute water among users, the transaction costs of organizing contracts with 
all holders of water rights have been and will be prohibitive. Water therefore is 
the quintessential public good for which markets do not work. Treating water as 
common property causes a tragic over exploitation as soon as water becomes a 
scarce commodity. Market failure is also characteristic of treating the right to 
use water as private property. Public water management avoids these problems 
by treating water as a form of inherently public property for which basic alloca-
tion and distribution decisions are made by public agencies. Economic incen-
tives, including fees, taxes, and “water banks,” are useful role in managing pub-
lic property, but true markets must remain a phenomenon marginal to the enter-
prise of managing large quantities of water for the benefit of numerous users. 
Keywords: common property; markets; private property; public property; 
regulated riparianism; tragedy of the commons; water rights; water bank 
1 Introduction 
 
Markets have become fashionable institutions for managing water both nation-
ally and internationally. (Anderson & Snyder; Dinar & Letey) Markets funda-
mentalists present markets as functioning automatically and nearly painlessly 
and market-based allocations as deserving a high presumption of validity, a pre-
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sumption only reinforced by the utter failure of socialism. Nonetheless, as an 
empirical matter, actual markets in free-flowing water have always been rare, 
and such markets as there have been generally were used for the transfer of rela-
tively small amounts of water among similar users. (Glass; Kloezen) Water 
markets have seldom been significant for changing the ways water is used. This 
raises an interesting, if obvious, question: If markets for water are so good, why 
are they so seldom used? 
 
Market fundamentalists seldom address this question except to denigrate their 
critics as holding cultural, religious, even mystical prejudices about water. 
(Brown) But water is different. Water is more immediately essential to life than 
any other resource except air. Deprive us of air, and we die in minutes; deprive 
us of water, and we die in days; deprive us of food, and we can last for weeks or 
months. Furthermore, water is an ambient resource that is in its very nature 
shared among users. Water and air are not only our most essential resources, 
they are also the quintessential “public goods”—goods for which the transaction 
costs are so high that no market can function with even minimal effectiveness. 
(Cowen; Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern) This reality should give even the most free-
market-oriented economist pause regarding whether true markets can function 
effectively for these resources. Treating water as common property leads into a 
tragic over exploitation as soon as water becomes a scarce commodity. Markets 
also fail if one attempts to treat the right to use water as private property. (Del-
lapenna 2000) What works best (albeit imperfectly) is to treat water as inher-
ently public property for which basic allocation decisions must be made by pub-
lic agencies. Various economic incentives, including fees, taxes, and “water 
banks,” are useful in managing public property, but markets must remain mar-
ginal to the management of large quantities of water for numerous diverse users. 
 
2 Patterns of Property in Water 
 
Markets are not a natural phenomenon. Markets are cultural artifacts created and 
structured by social arrangements in the form of law. To understand markets, 
and why they fail, one must examine the laws that structure a particular market, 
especially the laws that define the property rights that form the “objects” of the 
market’s transactions. The paradigm of property remains the ownership of land. 
Land can be marked off and considered for most purposes as the exclusive do-
main of a particular owner without regard for any effects on other persons or 
property—despite modern regulatory regimes. Land, however, stays within its 
boundaries. Flowing water simply does not fit very easily into such a paradigm. 
Claims to ownership of the right to use water have had to adapt to this reality.  
 
The three patterns of property in water—(1) common property; (2) private prop-
erty; and (3) public property—are found in various nations around the world. 
Because water allocation is a state matter in the American federal system, each 
of the three patterns is also found in the United States. Although there has been 
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some convergence in recent years regarding state water laws, the latest round of 
innovations have left the states of the United States grouped into three groups 
that are defined by the basic approach to property rights in water and which 
correspond to the three ideal types of property.  
 
In thinking of “property” in water, one likely has in mind a system of rights that 
define rights to water in clear and certain terms, with law serving to protect the 
resulting entitlements except in so far as the owners agree to changes through 
market transactions. The closest we come to such an arrangement in American 
law is appropriative rights. In contrast, a rule that allows anyone to use of a 
“common pool resource” so long as the use is “reasonable” hardly seems like a 
rule of property at all. Such a rule leaves courts to sort out conflicting claims of 
right in cases where one use directly interferes with another use through the law 
of torts (delicts). This is a rule of common property, rather than of private prop-
erty, somewhat as if tenants in common were to dispute the use of land. The 
American law of riparian rights is a prime example of such a legal regime. The 
third possibility is active public management of the common resource. The new-
est system of American law for the allocation of surface water, “regulated ripar-
ianism,” is such a public ownership model. 
 
3 Why Common Property Systems Cannot Survive 
 
Under a common property system, each common owner decides individually 
whether and how to use of the resource without regard to the effect on other 
common owners (except for direct interference with the uses of the others). 
Each owner will be able to appropriate for herself the whole of each additional 
increment of use, while the whole group will share equally the cost imposed on 
the common resource. Consider cows grazing on a common pasture. For each 
additional cow I add to the herd, I obtain the full benefit, while the common 
owners as a group share the burden of the reduction in pasturage. (Hardin) 
 
This account has been criticized by economists as having over simplified the 
reality of how “commons” functioned in prior times or in remote areas. Such 
commons have functioned satisfactorily over extended periods even when close 
to the carrying capacity of the resource through informal regulations in small 
communities sharing the commons. (McCay & Acheson; Ostrom) In a larger 
society, where most persons are strangers to each other, informal sanctions do 
not function effectively and formal law recognizes no real limits on any one’s 
exploitation of the commons. In such a context, as each user receives the full 
incremental value of the changes he induces while bearing only a small fraction 
of the costs, the only rational course for each common owner is to increase his 
uses until the resource is exhausted. We have witnessed this process over and 
over again regarding common pool resources when the rule of common property 
is not displaced by a different rule. Consider the fish in the sea or excessive de-
mands for access to national parks. (Nickler) 
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A private property system, in which the costs as well as the benefits of re-
source management decisions are concentrated on the particular owner making 
the decision, is a possible means to avoid the tragedy of the commons. In con-
trast, appeals to moderation and similar forms of moral suasion can only be self-
defeating: Those who responded to the appeal simply leave the field to the com-
mon owners who continue to increase their own exploitation of the resource to 
the point of exhaustion. As each realizes that heeding a moral appeal reduces 
their own gains with little or no benefit to the common resource, even many 
who agree with the appeal would not change their behavior. If exploitation of 
the common pool resource requires significant capital investment, the inability 
of potential investors to keep others from preempting an investor’s use causes 
under investment in the resource. Rather more puzzling is how, given the appar-
ent superiority of private property over common property as a resource man-
agement system, the common property system we now know as riparian rights 
came to be substituted for the earlier private property version of that system of 
law. 
 
4 Why Private Property Systems Fail for Water Resources 
 
The “natural flow” theory of riparian rights once provided as clear and certain a 
system of property law as one could imagine. Apart from domestic uses, each 
riparian owner had an unqualified right to have water flow down undiminished 
in quality and unchanged in quantity, and hence was limited to using flowing 
water only to the extent that she could do so without affecting the right of any 
lower riparian to the continued natural flow of the water. In the mid- to late-
nineteenth century the natural flow theory was replaced the eastern United 
States with the “reasonable use” theory—a common property system. (Horwitz; 
Rose) Similar transitions are now underway in the United States for diffused 
surface water and for groundwater. Transitions from private property systems to 
common property systems are rare. Some legal historians have described the 
earlier transition in riparian rights as a means for introducing flexible develop-
ment into a capital poor and technologically backward, but resource rich, nine-
teenth-century America. (Horwitz) The more recent transitions, however, sug-
gest that the problem is more basic than mere lack of cash, suggesting that, de-
spite the asserted advantages of private property, it does not work well for am-
bient resources like water. 
 
While a private-property market system is the best mechanism for allocating 
resources when it works, that system fails if there are significant barriers to the 
functioning of a market. (Coase) That markets for water as such have never ac-
tually played a large role even in a private-property system like appropriative 
rights suggests that markets do not work well for ambient resources like water. 
When one user attempts to convey a water right, particularly to someone seek-
ing to make a completely different use of the water, the problem of “external-
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ities” arises—a use by one person affects uses by many others, perhaps all other 
uses from the same source, and hence a significant change in use infringes upon 
the interests of the other users. While it is theoretically possible for a properly 
structured market to cope with these concerns, in any hydrologically large and 
complex system the difficulty and expense of structuring transactions (transac-
tion costs) prevent markets from developing unless the law disregards external-
ities. The law of appropriative rights, however, has consistently held that even a 
senior appropriator cannot change the time, place, or manner or use if the 
change would produce a significant injury to a junior appropriator—even 
though the senior appropriator has rights superior to those of a junior appropria-
tor. (Howe, Boggs, & Butler) Generally the burden of proof that there will be no 
injury to other users of water is on the one seeking to make the change. There-
fore, if the evidence is inconclusive, courts prohibit the change. Uncertainty 
regarding what portion of the water diverted from the stream (the usual measure 
of the appropriative right) was consumptively used by the senior appropriator 
and what portion constituted a return flow to the benefit of junior appropriators 
is quite normal. Upon considering these rules, one readily grasps why small-
scale transfers of water rights among farmers or ranchers—all of whom are 
making roughly similar uses—are the only ones that regularly occurred without 
state intervention.  
 
The law of prior appropriation does not go as far as it might in inhibiting trans-
fers of water to new uses. Generalized social costs, such as the loss of tax reve-
nues to a community, are not protected from the effects of transfers. The protec-
tion of the rights of junior appropriators, however, provides sufficient deter-
rence to market transactions that it really does not matter that general social 
costs are ignored. In the nineteenth century, a time of limited and ineffective 
government, a transition from a private property system (which had the effect of 
freezing use patterns rather than of creating a market) to a common property 
system introduced flexibility, thereby promoting social and economic develop-
ment. Transitions from private property to common property also, whether in-
tended or not, worked a massive and continuing, if haphazard, wealth redistribu-
tion. (Buchanon & Yoon; Heller; Horwitz) Today, the transition to a common 
property system seems much less prudent as the demands for water outstrip sup-
plies, creating a real risk of the tragedy of the commons as under traditional 
riparian rights. 
 
5 The California Water Bank 
 
When California found itself facing a five-year long drought, it transferred wa-
ter from low valued agricultural uses to higher valued urban uses not by replac-
ing its private property system with a common property system, but by creating 
a “market” where none had existed before. (Israel & Lund; O’Brien & Gunning) 
California did so by creating an institution known as a “water bank.” The water 
bank itself was a small affair by California standards, involving in its peak year 
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(1992) some 400,000 acre-feet compared to the state’s shortfall of more than 
6,000,000 acre-feet. The water bank was a most unusual market: For the 350 
persons willing to sell water rights, the state was the only buyer; for the 20 insti-
tutions who were willing to buy them, the state was the only seller. California 
simply decreed that in buying or selling water it need not concern itself with the 
effects of its transactions on third parties, including their water rights. Nor did 
the resulting prices ($125/ac-ft. to sellers, $400/ac-ft. to buyers) result from bid-
ding in a market. The state set the prices and selected buyers and sellers by ad-
ministrative decision, without regard to willingness to participate in the market.   
 
Under the California water bank, the state applied economic incentives to en-
courage water users to comply with the state’s policy choices while disregarding 
the effects of the state’s actions on yet other users whose claims would preclude 
accomplishment of the state’s goals. The California water bank has the same 
effects as did the nineteenth century transition from the natural flow theory of 
riparian rights to the reasonable use theory of riparian rights. Flexibility is intro-
duced to enable fundamental transformation of water uses within the state, and 
wealth is transferred from those who formerly used water to those who thereaf-
ter would use water. (Carter, Vaux, & Scuering) These may or may not be laud-
able goals in California in the late twentieth century, but the means used to 
achieve these goals do not involve either private property rights in water or the 
functioning of a true market. The water bank was a public management system 
including, but not limited to, economic incentives as a management tool. In 
short, it was a system of state management hiding behind the façade of a market. 
6 The Public Property Option 
 
Today, both states and nations increasingly turn to active public management 
for surface water exploitation, for surface drainage, and for groundwater. These 
governments have concluded that, despite the considerable difficulties in defin-
ing appropriate public goals or in making the right decisions to achieve those 
goals, a transition to public property offers significant advantages over both 
common property and private property in terms of efficiency and distributive 
justice—whether measured in terms of economic or non-economic values. The 
core concept of a public property system in water is expressed in regulated ri-
parian statutes as the requirement that all uses qualifying for a permit must be 
“reasonable.” (Dellapenna 1997; Dellapenna 2001) The factors considered in 
determining whether a particular use is reasonable under such statutes are virtu-
ally identical with the factors considered under the discredited reasonable use 
theory of traditional riparian rights. If the decision-making process were to con-
tinue to be a crisis-response process that comes into play only after significant 
interference arises between competing uses, the regulated riparian statutes 
would suffer from the same faults as common-law riparian rights. The regulated 
riparian statutes, however, create a process for deciding whether a proposed use 
is reasonable before investment in the use through the issuance or denial of a 
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permit. The permit process fundamentally transforms the operation of the “rea-
sonableness” concept from that under traditional riparian rights. 
 
Under traditional riparian rights, a judicial determination of whether a particular 
use is reasonable has always been relational, focusing on the relative social util-
ity of the particular uses before a court. While generalized interests widely dif-
fused among the public theoretically could be included in the process of judi-
cially weighing one use against another, this rarely occurred except perhaps 
through unarticulated intuitions. The administering agency relies on experts who 
devote their professional life to studying just such questions. Their knowledge, 
and the plans called for in the controlling statute, shapes the weighing process in 
a manner which is at once more abstract and more responsive to the total reality 
surrounding the use of water in a state. Such an ambitious program of public 
management might very well fall short of its goals set. It might be improved by 
the introduction of various economic incentives as part of the public manage-
ment scheme. One simply should not confuse economic incentives with markets.   
 
Even with economic incentives, the enterprise of moving fundamental decisions 
concerning the use of water by private parties from the actors involved into the 
hands of experts working in an administrative agency poses daunting chal-
lenges. It is possible, as public choice theorists argue, that the transition to a 
public property system can be explained either as a simple error on the part of 
state governments (but so many?), or as yet another form of rent seeking by 
those who are powerful in the government yet not powerful (or at least not pow-
erful) in the marketplace. (Farber & Frickey; Mashaw)  
 
The administration of the public property system will be less than perfect re-
gardless of the motivations behind its introduction. Whether the resulting permit 
process is superior to either traditional riparian rights, to appropriative rights, to 
a purely market system, or to some other regulatory system has been, and con-
tinues to be, hotly debated. How one resolves these questions is largely a func-
tion of how much confidence one has in the ability of a bureaucratic structure to 
manage a common pool resource compared to the alternatives. Yet one cannot 
have much confidence in a market system given the scarcity of actual empirical 
experience with such a system and given the enormous complexities of transac-
tion costs and externalities present in any market for water rights.  
 
Because of the growing shortages of water relative to demand in most eastern 
states of the United States, the trend towards regulated riparianism is likely to 
strengthen because the system has at least three demonstrable advantages over 
traditional riparian rights. (Dellapenna 2000) First, so long as water is treated as 
a common pool resource, we face the “tragedy of the commons”; only active 
public management can avoid the utter destruction of the resource. Second, hav-
ing a permit in advance of investment provides the security of right necessary 
for intelligent planning or investment decisions. Finally, the emphasis on com-
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prehensive planning under regulated riparianism creates the possibility that a 
problem will be recognized and responded to before it becomes a crisis. 
 
Accepting the public managerial impulse has substantial costs in terms of 
money and in terms of the risk of poor decisions by the managers. Monetary 
costs include the salaries and other expenses of the administering agency and of 
any reviewing agencies, and the costs of applicants and permittees in complying 
with the numerous procedures and requirements imposed by the agency. Ex-
empting from the administrative process users consuming only small quantities 
of water or who make low-valued uses can reduce some of these costs, but only 
by leaving out of the system uses that in the aggregate can amount to a major 
portion of total consumption. Small or low-valued uses might be included in the 
process with subsidies through lower fees or complete exemptions from fees, 
but these users must still incur the expenses of preparing any necessary informa-
tion to apply for or to comply with a permit. Fee subsidies also increase the bur-
dens of the system on permittees who have to pay for the full cost of their per-
mits or on the general taxpayer who in fact fund most regulated riparian sys-
tems. 
 
The occurrence of poor management is more difficult to assess, in part because 
there is considerable disagreement about what is the test of good management. 
If one takes a purely economic approach, almost any subsidy to a low-valued 
use will appear as poor management, as will any management at all if the hydro-
logic system generally supplies a surplus to all foreseeable potential users. Yet 
to others, such policies will appear to be merely the management of a major 
public resource in a socially responsible manner, a manner that does not “sur-
render” to the marketplace. Still, even some who favor such management be-
cause of a desire for social equity, as well as those who argue for economic effi-
ciency as the primary, if not only, criterion for social policy, have raised serious 
questions about whether the experts at any administering agency can realisti-
cally be expected to acquire the necessary information ever to arrive at the right 
conclusions. When one adds the unrepresentative nature of the bureaucratic 
process and the tendency of any error to be enormously magnified when applied 
uniformly through a bureaucratic mechanism, and one might well ask why the 
public managerial impulse is now so popular. 
 
The question is not, however, whether a public property system creates a perfect 
system of water allocation, but whether it creates a better system than is other-
wise available. The rarity of markets for water rights, coupled with the deficien-
cies of either common property or private property systems in water, suggests 
that the allocation of water is not particularly efficient under those models ei-
ther, and that the loss in efficiency, if any, from adopting public property system 
is not likely to be high, and might well prove to be a gain. The problem of using 
water management to further social justice while preventing too much power 
from accumulating in the hands of an unelected elite is the central political prob-
lem in our increasingly administrative governments. Like the problem of effi-
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ciency, there is no easy or certain means of resolving the problem. An active 
legislative involvement to provide concrete guidance would provide only a par-
tial solution. Such an approach, however, perhaps increases the chances of ma-
nipulation of the legislative process to enable particular social groups to capture 
social rents for themselves. One must examine carefully whether actual experi-
ence of water markets suggests that such a system is workable; if not, one is left 
with little else than to attempt to make a public property system work effectively 
and equitably. 
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